According to a recent report, Pakistan may give China a lease over Gilgit Baltistan in order to pay off its growing debt. Mumtaz Nagri, the leader of the Karakoram National Movement, voiced concern that the remote Gilgit Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir would someday serve as a venue for conflict between superpowers. They are urging their people to protest it, to not be afraid of the ISI, and to even be prepared to go to jail.
The ceding of Gilgit Baltistan would be a boon for China’s expansion plans. It would like the region as it is on the trail of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan would however benefit greatly from such a deal as it faces a terrible economic crisis. This move would earn Pakistan a hefty lease of money and help it tide over the economic crisis.
China’s loan to Pakistan-
But Pakistan will be taking a calculated risk because doing so runs the danger of upsetting the US and losing out on IMF bailouts worth $3 billion. It may also prevent recipients from receiving funds from the World Bank, IMF, and other international organisations. Local protests would occur even if Pakistan decided to move forward with the plan, since the populace already feels frustrated and upset about how Gilgit Baltistan was bypassed by the CPEC at Islamabad’s request.
Gilgit Baltistan has very poor socioeconomic conditions. Due to its exclusion from Pakistan’s national grid, the region only receives two hours of power per day. However, the US is not in the mood to leave the region because it wants to stop any potential Chinese advance into South Asia. The US may desire its own outpost instead. It has been stated that if Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan were both separate countries, the US might have had an advantage in Afghanistan. Instead of relying on Pakistan, the US might have exploited Balochistan to support its forces in Afghanistan if it had been an independent nation.
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Let’s delve a little deeper into the Gilgit Baltistan conflict.
A second-class region?
On June 12, Gilgit-Baltistan’s Chief Minister, Khalid Khurshid Khan, accused Islamabad of purposefully “pushing the territory backward” by slashing the province’s development budget in half, from PKR 47 billion to PKR 23 billion. Gilgit-Baltistan only has two hours of power available despite powering the rest of the nation because it is not connected to Pakistan’s national grid. In addition, it lacks control over its hydropower and other resources and experiences food shortages.
Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Tanveer Ilyas, and his Cabinet chose not to present the budget because of the same issue, alleging that such cuts made governance impossible. Ilyas argued that Islamabad could not afford to be so negligent in light of the sensitivity of his region as “the base camp of [Kashmir’s] freedom but also strategically vital in view of India’s presence along the Line of Control.”
Both Khan and Ilyas are members of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and come from political backgrounds (PTI). Ilyas overthrew the previous administration while Khan supposedly came to power through falsified elections. Well, according to “tradition,” individuals who are close to Islamabad’s political elite are given the highest positions in these two regions. How Pakistani mainland political parties win elections in a region that is not a part of their constitutionally assigned territory is the legal question.
Islamabad has been treating the residents of PoK as second-class citizens for many years, but things finally seem to be reaching a breaking point. Along with the reduction in funding, the Chinese are currently stealing their resources and lands.
The poor balance of power-
The “Chief Minister” of Gilgit-Baltistan and the “Prime Minister” of “Azad Kashmir” really have much less authority than a Chief Minister in India. Everything important in “Azad Kashmir” is governed by a council led by the prime minister of Pakistan, from newspapers to the selection of judges, the election commissioner, the auditor general, and similar positions. Although the Federal Bureau of Revenue of Pakistan is used to choose tax officials, the legislative assembly does have some tax-levying authority.
The 13th Amendment to the “interim constitution” was quietly introduced in 2018 by the local government and the then-outgoing Nawaz Sharif government. It made the constitution a permanent document, transferred 52 topics from the council to the assembly, and for the first time included fundamental rights that are a part of the Pakistani constitution. It subtly changed the weak power balance with Islamabad. It was not to be, though.
The Imran Khan administration not only reversed the entire procedure, but also further eliminated any remaining authority, leaving the “Prime Minister” of “Azad Kashmir” today little more than a rubber stamp. There is no indication of the constitution, temporary or otherwise. In Gilgit-Baltistan, roughly the same thing took place.
The Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, approved by Islamabad, eliminated an entire level of government and returned all authority to the Chief Minister, reversing certain minor liberties that had been granted by previous administrations. As a result, there were protests against the so-called “Emperor’s Ordinance.” Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, the former prime minister, and the concerned federal minister were given a contempt of court notice by the Gilgit-Baltistan appellate court for breaking the law. The court also harshly criticised the decree. Gilgit-prior Baltistan’s intentions to become a province are unlikely to come to fruition because doing so would not only cost more money but also give the local government more control over decisions about how Pakistan or China should manage the region’s resources.
Gilgit-Baltistan and “Azad Kashmir” therefore have a type of limited government, and it is from within these that officials are fighting against drastic budget cuts that will render already weak administrations entirely dysfunctional.
Will China make a big mistake?
Hunza, a region in Gilgit-Baltistan with rich mineral resources, recently saw protests over the leasing out of its lands to the Chinese, with inhabitants resorting to stoning convoys of the Pakistani army. Hunza is a treasure trove for rare earth elements including niobium and neodymium, essential light rare earth elements used in products like electric vehicles, turbines, and motors in addition to rubies and emeralds.
The number of demonstrations against arbitrary land usage has increased recently. The development of the Gilgit Skardu road recently sparked protests against the Frontier Works Organization, during which at least two ministers were assaulted. As officials attempted to bulldoze the acquisition of land without compensating the locals, CPEC projects like the Maqpundas EEZ in Gilgit ran against a land ownership issue. In addition to the planned emphasis on agriculture, which is essential to the CPEC Master Plan, it now appears that the land grab will likely be expanded to encompass mineral resources.
Islamabad is currently having trouble reconciling its budget, especially the defence budget, with a $6.4 billion debt that the International Monetary Fund finds to be problematic. As a result, it has very little financial resources to support its own provinces. It would probably be more susceptible to China’s requests for more access to the ungoverned (and poorly-governed) PoK territory in such a situation.
The earlier proposals to turn Gilgit-Baltistan into a province are not likely to come to fruition since, in addition to costing more money, doing so would give the local government greater authority and allow it to decide whether Pakistan or China should utilise the region’s resources. The inhabitants of PoK will only be affected downward as things become worse from here
